Ghada Karmi :: One State, Two States, Bi-Nationalism

http://www.jfjfp.org/karmi_twostates.htm

from http://www.jfjfp.org/backgroundQ.htm


A SECULAR DEMOCRATIC STATE IN HISTORIC PALESTINE: AN IDEA WHOSE
TIME HAS COME?

By Ghada Karmi | July 2002 | Al-Adab, Lebanon

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the idea of a two-state solution has become a
persistent theme in the discourse on the Palestinians-Israeli conflict.
In 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed, there was a prevalent view
that the creation of an independent Palestinian state was only a matter
of time. Although the Accords never explicitly said this - indeed they
indicated no specific end point - it did not deter most Palestinians and
others from this view. Now, nearly nine years later and despite the
changes on the ground, the official Palestinian position with regard to
an independent state remains the same. It has in fact been reinforced by
European and US support, verbally at least, and now represents the
established view about the ultimate aim of Palestinian aspirations.

The history of the Palestinian state originates with the Palestine
National Council (PNC) decision taken in 1974 to establish a Palestinian
"authority" on any liberated part of the Palestinian homeland. This was
later defined to mean statehood and since then, the Palestinian
leadership has consistently aimed for an independent state, to be set up
in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab
League accepted "Palestine" as a member state in 1976. In November 1988,
the PNC meeting in Algiers formally accepted the existence of two
separate states, Israel and the new Palestine.

In 1997, Yasser Arafat announced that the PLO would declare the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state on May 4 1999. Though
this never happened, he has been reiterating this position ever since.

Although the exact boundaries of the proposed state have not been
defined, despite the rumors that came out form the Camp David and Taba
talks in 2000-2001, the idea of such an entity "alongside Israel" has
taken firm hold. And it seems that there is widespread if tacit
acceptance of the idea even in Israel; although there has never been any
official Israeli endorsement of a Palestine state, there is a feeling of
resignation towards this as a probable outcome. As a result, the idea of
two states as the preferred solution to the conflict has become so
dominant as to exclude all other possibilities. Yet, the current Israeli
military assault on the Palestinians and Israel's cantonization and
unrelenting colonisation of Palestinian land has made it imperative to
review this position. Is a Palestinian state in today's circumstances
feasible?

The two-state solution

Irrespective of whether this solution is politically wise or desirable,
a glance at the latest map of the occupied territories suggests that it
might be impossible to realize it on simple logistical grounds. The West
Bank of today is pock-marked by Jewish settlements encircling
Palestinian towns and separating them from each other, criss-crossed by
bypass roads built for the exclusive use of Israelis and breaking up
Palestinian territory even more.

Sharing the territory of the West Bank and Gaza with the Palestinians
are over 180,000 Jewish settlers and a Jewish population of over 200,000
in and around east Jerusalem. There is no territorial continuity between
the Palestinian areas in the West Bank, which are cut off from each
other, from Gaza and from Jerusalem.

If the settlements remain, then any projected Palestinian state would
have no meaningful territory on which to become established. The problem
is further complicated by the lack of natural resources and economic
disruption from which the Palestinian areas currently suffer. This
derives from thirty years of Israeli occupation which transferred
resources from the Palestinian inhabitants to the settlers, as well as
the Israeli policy of closures imposed on Gaza and the West Bank since
1993. The Palestinian areas suffer from high unemployment, (over 50 per
cent in Gaza, over 30 per cent in the West Bank), imposed trade
restrictions, an undeveloped industrial base and poor natural resources.
Any Palestinian state set up on this basis is not economically viable
and could only survive with a massive infusion of billions of dollars in
aid.

Israel's vision for a final settlement cedes little to Palestinian
aspirations for a state of their own. Israel would keep much of the land
and control all the resources. East Jerusalem would remain part of
Israel's "united capital" forever. No Israeli plan so far has offered
the Palestinians enough territory for a viable state. Without a total
removal of the settlements and an Israeli withdrawal from East
Jerusalem, the formula hitherto put forward for a Palestinian state, to
be set up in the whole of the West Bank and Gaza up to the 1967 borders
with East Jerusalem as its capital, simply cannot occur. In order to
realize the aim of the two states, one would have to postulate either a
voluntary Israeli renunciation of the settlements and East Jerusalem or
an external agency willing to pressurize Israel into doing so. Neither
of these options is currently on offer and in any case, the practical
difficulties of evacuating all the settlers, and disengaging from the
West Bank in terms of security, water and infrastructure would be so
formidable as to make an Israeli government of any persuasion unwilling
to do it.

The one-state solution

For these reasons, a Palestinian state as envisaged is not feasible, and
the situation on the ground makes even a physical separation of the two
peoples hard to achieve. Given these circumstances, abandoning the
two-state solution in favor of one state to include both peoples would
seem the obvious alternative. The history of the single state solution
on the Palestinian side in fact goes back nearly thirty years. The
proposal to create what was then called a secular democratic state in
Palestine was first propounded in 1969 by the left-wing PLO faction, the
DFLP, and formally adopted in the modified version of a "democratic
state of Palestine" by the PNC meeting that year. With a few exceptions,
the proposal was met with rejection on both sides. The Israelis
considered it quite simply a recipe for their destruction, and the
Palestinians thought it an unacceptable concession to the enemy. It was
never followed through by either side and was quietly dropped after
1974, as the option of a West Bank state began to unfold.

In recent times and faced with the current political impasse, the idea
of one state for the two peoples has begun to resurface among a small
number of left wing Israelis and Palestinians, albeit from varying
perspectives and for different motives. The debate centers on what form
this state should take, whether bi-national or secular and democratic.
Bi-nationalism is not a new idea in Israeli thinking. During the 1930s
and 40s, European intellectual Zionists like Martin Buber, Judah Magnes
and Arthur Ruppin, were much interested in creating a bi-national state
in Palestine in which both communities could live together. Some
Zionists proposed living with the Arabs in a cantonization arrangement
on the Swiss model. This would give the Jews self-government in the
localities in which they lived and the rest of the country would be
split up into Christian and Muslim self-governing cantons.

A few Palestinians agreed with the cantonization idea, because they
thought it could be a way of halting Zionist ambitions towards creating
a Jewish state in Palestine. But the vast majority were opposed to
bi-nationalism in any form, since it would have given a foreign minority
who had no rights to the country an equal share of Palestine and would
enable them to pursue their Zionist aim of domination. On the Jewish
side, the advocates of bi-nationalism remained a small, ineffective
minority and their ideas were superseded in 1948 when Israel was set up
as a Jewish state. The discourse on this theme then went into abeyance,
but has re-surfaced among a few modern day left-wing Zionists who are
today concerned with bi-nationalism once again..

In a bi-national state, Jews and Palestinians would coexist as separate
communities in a federal arrangement. Each people would run its own
affairs autonomously and be guaranteed the legal right to use its own
language, religion and traditions. Both would participate in government
in a single parliament, which would be concerned with matters of
supra-communal importance, defense, resources, the economy and so on.
Such a state could be modeled on the cantonal structure of Switzerland
or the bi-national arrangement of Belgium. In the Palestine/Israel case,
the cantonal structure would be based on the present demographic pattern
of the country where densely Arab populated areas like the Galilee would
become Arab cantons, and Jewish ones like Tel Aviv would be Jewish
cantons, and so on. This leaves a number of practical issues to be
resolved, as for example, the exact composition and powers of the
parliament, the exercise the right of return for Jews and that for Arabs
and so on.

However, the debate is still new and the Palestinian side, beyond a very
small number of people, of whom the Knesset member Azmi Bishara and the
Palestinian academic Edward Said are the most prominent, has yet to
enter it. But at least implicit in these proposals is a recognition that
Israel is in fact something of a bi-national state already, since a
fifth of its current population inside the Green Line is Palestinian
Arab. The democratic secular state on the other hand envisions a
one-man, one-vote polity without reference to ethnicity or creed. It
would aim to create an equitable pluralist society on the Western
democratic model, and is opposed to an arrangement of separate
communities. This idea has far fewer adherents and these, outside the
tiny ranks of anti-Zionist Jews like Professor Ilan Pappe of Haifa
University, and others who are, like myself, mostly Palestinian.

Objections to the one-state solution

Irrespective of which system is chosen, the one-state solution is
unlikely to find acceptance amongst the mass of Palestinians or
Israelis. Currently, there are several arguments put forward against it:

*Firstly it is maintained that Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians will
never accept integration. There is therefore a choice between separation
and military conquest by one side. Separation is the more humane of
these possibilities.

But is the premise true? In reality there are many instances in world
history of integration between peoples who appeared to be totally
irreconcilable before the resolution of a conflict. Perhaps the most
relevant, though still fragile, example is South Africa. England
following the Civil War is another. It should never be forgotten that
more than half the Jewish population of Israel came from Arab countries,
where they were relatively well integrated. Though most of these now
speak Hebrew and see themselves as Israelis, they retain strong elements
of their Arabic culture and have recently begun to celebrate these
openly.

*Secondly, it is pointed out that Israel has the military power to do
what it likes. In these circumstances the Palestinians should take what
they can get and live to fight another day.

This may be a realistic philosophy, but the Palestinians show no
inclination to capitulate. Despite their military weakness, they
continue to fight as we see in the current intifada because they
perceive that military power is not the only form of power. There is a
moral argument against capitulation to injustice and this has entrenched
itself in Palestinian consciousness. Recent developments on the
international stage seem to have endorsed this position. Any deal that
ignored the moral argument would not last long.

*Thirdly, it is argued that although far from perfect, the two-state
solution offers a way forward which could later be developed into
something more just - for example a federation or an economic union.
Others would view it as the first step leading to a one-state solution.
Many take this position because they believe a direct confrontation with
Zionism given the present balance of power would prove ineffective. Let
Zionism wither away as demographic and economic reality seeps in, they
think.

Not attacking Zionism now simply stores up trouble for the future. The
imbalance of power between Israel and a Palestinian state would ensure
that 'further developments' would always be to Israel's advantage and to
Palestine's disadvantage. In the context of the essentially racist
nature of Zionism, I cannot conceive that a two-state resolution would
result in any form of equality between the two.

*Fourthly, proponents of a unitary state are accused of diverting energy
and attention away from what is attainable (two states) in favor of what
is utopian and impossible to realize (one state).

This objection might be justified if the two-state solution were either
both feasible in terms of practicality or desirable in terms of
principle.

*Fifthly, it is argued that the creation of a unitary state poses
formidable obstacles. How would it come about? Would Jews have a 'right
of return' like the Palestinians? What would be the character of the
hybrid state that would emerge and how would it be accepted by the rest
of the Arab world? Would it be predominantly Arab with a Jewish aspect
or the other way round?

These questions are hard to answer. There is no real historical
precedent to draw on for guidance. The reality is that such issues will
be faced when the initial and hardest step is taken, that is the
decision to set up a unitary state. Once that is achieved, the rest must
come through discussion and experience. It would be idle to pretend that
the Zionist project in Palestine has not created a massive problem for
the region. Dealing with its consequences will not be easy, but that
cannot be a reason for not trying or for aiding the survival of Zionism
through supporting the continuation of a Jewish state.

Bi-nationalism and the right of return

In the context of a unitary state solution, the bi-national state
proposal is obviously less unacceptable, since it can be designed to
mimic closely a two-state solution tipped in favor of the stronger side.
But from a Palestinian viewpoint, for bi-nationalism to be equitable and
not just a re-hash of the present formula of Israeli hegemony, it must
provide for the right of return of Palestinian refugees to the state and
for restitution of the land and resources which were stolen from them.
The Jewish law of return must be cancelled and the bi-national state
should be configured along non-Zionist lines, since it was the
exclusivist and discriminatory nature of Zionism, which created the
original problem. The prominent Israeli sociologist, Sami Smoocha, who
conducted several surveys of Jewish society since the 1970s, has
observed that the Jewish public in Israel was 'both racist and rigid'
and it was this which was the cause of the persisting Jewish-Arab
conflict.

The discussion is, however, somewhat academic in the light of current
Israeli public opinion, where bi-nationalism in any form attracts
minimal support.

The secular democratic state

The secular state idea can be expected to attract few adherents at the
moment.. For it would effectively spell the end of Zionism and force
Israelis to share equitably the land they view as exclusively Jewish
with non-Jews. It is scarcely better for the Palestinians, for whom it
means the end of the dream of a sovereign Palestinian state which had
become familiar and seemed until recently so attainable. The prospect of
life with the Israelis, after decades of hatred and the present Israeli
assault, would seem unacceptable. And yet, what alternative is there now
to a one-state solution? Ironically enough, it is the Israelis
government's annexationist policies in the occupied territories which
have destroyed the two-state option. In fragmenting the West Bank so
effectively, they have ensured that no separate state can exist there
and thus opened the door to the one-state alternative. As a result, the
option of a Palestinian state is no longer feasible.

Nor, from a Palestinian viewpoint, is it even desirable; a two-state
solution, had it ever happened, would have been unstable and ultimately
unacceptable to the Palestinians. It would have given them at best a
truncated entity, certainly demilitarized and economically dependent, on
a fifth of their original homeland (even were they offered the whole of
the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, these would form only 23 per
cent of Mandate Palestine). It would be unable to absorb the 4 million
displaced Palestinians, and would end any hope of their right to return
to their original homes. Most seriously, it would have set the seal of
approval on the Zionist claim to Palestine as the exclusive land of the
Jews which no Palestinian has ever accepted.

The Palestinian sense of injustice, which fundamentally derives from the
loss of their homeland and the denial of their right to return to it,
will not be redressed by an unequal arrangement of two states. And if
the injustice is left unresolved, it will remain a source of instability
and a cause of "terrorism" in the region. No one denies that there will
be massive obstacles in the way of implementing a one-state solution in
Israel/Palestine. Nor can the past be reversed, but a solution even at
this late stage, which permits the equitable sharing of the whole land
between the two peoples and repatriates the refugees will help lay the
foundations for a stable future. Given the present structure of Israel
and the occupied territories, which is bi-national in all but name, a
formal policy of bi-nationalism is not unthinkable. It may even
ultimately pave the way to the secular democratic state in historic
Palestine. This might seem utopian now, but is it any more so than the
Zionist enterprise of constructing a Jewish state in someone else's
country?